Skip to content

Verdicts and threat model

Every checked unit, an event or a snapshot, gets exactly one verdict, written to Kafka beside what it judges. A verdict names the device, the counter, the build digest and the twin digest, so each one is evidence about a specific signed build.

  1. Authenticate. Decrypt if encrypted. Verify the COSE_Sign1 signature with the device key, whose certificate chains to the secure element’s manufacturer. Check that the build digest is a subject of a verified provenance attestation, and that the twin digest is the one attested for that build.
  2. Order. The counter must be the last one plus one, and the previous-event hash must match. A lower counter with the same hash is a duplicate; a jump is a gap; a hash mismatch is a broken chain.
  3. Step the twin. In same-machine mode, feed the device’s input to the twin and compare state and emits. In model mode, check that the observed event is a transition the twin allows from its current state, then take it.
  4. Record. Write the verdict, and advance the twin only on a conforming event.
Verdict Meaning Typical response
Conforms Authentic, in order, and what the twin predicts or allows None
Duplicate The same signed event again, from at-least-once delivery Drop silently
Gap The counter jumped: events were lost or withheld Alert; the twin waits or resynchronizes
Unauthenticated Signature, certificate or hash chain fails Quarantine the device
Unattested build The build or twin digest has no valid attestation Quarantine; the device runs unknown software
Divergent Same-machine mode: the twin computed a different state or emit Incident: tampering or a runtime defect
Illegal transition Model mode: the event is not allowed from the current state Incident or a model gap, triaged by a person

A verdict is evidence about behaviour. It is not a legal finding, a certification or a safety function.

The design detects most tampering after the build and much misbehaviour at run time. It cannot prove that software is benign, and it sees only what the events show.

Threat What detects it What remains
A malicious dependency enters the build The SBOM names it; provenance names the build that took it in A signature does not make code benign; the twin catches it only if behaviour changes
The CI identity is abused to sign a bad build Every signing is in the transparency log; monitor it for your own identities Detection, not prevention: revoke and rebuild
A device runs other software The attestation token’s measured digest has no attestation: Unattested build Depends on measured boot being sound
Events are forged or replayed The secure-element key, the counter and the hash chain None, while the key stays in the chip
The broker or Kafka drops or reorders events Counter and hash chain: Gap An attacker can still delay or withhold
A device goes silent The twin expects a heartbeat event within a deadline The deadline sets how late it is noticed
Software emits correct events but does the wrong thing Only as far as events reflect real effects Sign inputs and outputs close to the hardware
The secure element is physically attacked Out of scope Revoke the device certificate
The twin itself is wrong Replay over history before release; triage of illegal transitions False alarms and blind spots until the model is fixed
The twin service is compromised Out of scope today Open question: sign verdict batches with the service’s own Sigstore identity