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CI build and Sigstore signing

The build layer uses only published standards and Sigstore. Every artifact (a crate, a WASI component, a container image, a firmware image) gets the same signature and the same three attestations: provenance, SBOM and twin.

Concern Standard Identifier What it proves
Envelope in-toto attestation, DSSE envelope https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1 Binds a typed claim to artifact digests
Provenance SLSA Provenance v1 https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 Which builder, source, parameters and dependencies
Contents CycloneDX SBOM (or SPDX) https://cyclonedx.org/bom Every component and version inside the artifact
Identity Sigstore Fulcio Short-lived X.509 certificate The CI job’s OIDC identity signed it; no long-lived key exists
Transparency Sigstore Rekor Inclusion proof The signing happened, publicly, at a given time
Packaging Sigstore bundle *.sigstore.json Signature, certificate and log proof in one file

The job asks GitLab for an OIDC token with audience sigstore. cosign reads it from SIGSTORE_ID_TOKEN, gets a certificate from Fulcio, signs, records the entry in Rekor and discards the key.

build_and_attest:
id_tokens:
SIGSTORE_ID_TOKEN:
aud: sigstore
variables:
COSIGN_YES: "true"
script:
- cargo build --release --locked
- cargo cyclonedx --format json
- cosign sign-blob app.wasm --bundle app.wasm.sigstore.json
- cosign attest-blob app.wasm --type https://cyclonedx.org/bom --predicate app.cdx.json --bundle app.sbom.sigstore.json
- cosign attest-blob app.wasm --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 --predicate provenance.json --bundle app.slsa.sigstore.json

Verification pins both the issuer and the exact pipeline identity: the project URL, //, the CI file path, @ and the ref.

Terminal window
cosign verify-blob app.wasm --bundle app.wasm.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity "https://gitlab.com/<group>/<project>//.gitlab-ci.yml@refs/tags/v1.4.0" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://gitlab.com"

The workflow asks for an OIDC token with id-token: write; cosign picks it up by itself.

permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
steps:
- run: cosign sign-blob app.wasm --bundle app.wasm.sigstore.json
- run: cosign attest-blob app.wasm --type https://cyclonedx.org/bom --predicate app.cdx.json --bundle app.sbom.sigstore.json
Terminal window
cosign verify-blob app.wasm --bundle app.wasm.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity "https://github.com/<owner>/<repo>/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v1.4.0" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"

GitHub’s built-in actions/attest writes provenance, and with sbom-path an SBOM attestation; it needs id-token: write, contents: read and attestations: write. Consumers verify with gh attestation verify. The twin attestation, with its own predicate type, still goes through cosign attest-blob.

GitHub’s Sigstore instance for private repositories has no transparency log, so you cannot monitor it for abuse of your CI identity. Sign against the public instance, or your own, when that matters.

What decides the setup is how the build job proves who it is. Keyless signing needs an OIDC token that Fulcio trusts. Without one, the job signs with a key held in a KMS, Vault or an HSM (cosign sign-blob --key awskms://…), and verifiers pin the public key. Everything downstream stays the same.

The public-good instance is the default: nothing to run, and anyone can verify. An organization that must not publish its build identities, or that runs air-gapped, operates its own Fulcio, Rekor, timestamp authority and CT log. Verifiers then trust that instance through cosign verify-blob --trusted-root trusted_root.json, with the trusted root distributed through the organization’s own TUF repository. Devices verify offline in both cases, from a trusted root provisioned with their firmware.