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Chain of trust and RATS

A signed build proves where software came from. It does not prove that the running software behaves the way its authors said it would. COREWARD Twin closes that gap with two layers that share one chain of trust.

  • Build layer. Each build ships with an SBOM (software bill of materials) and a SLSA provenance statement, both signed keylessly through Sigstore and recorded in its transparency log.
  • Twin layer. The software’s intended behaviour is written as a state machine, its digital twin. The twin’s definition is signed and attested with the build. A reference twin on the server checks every signed event the device reports against it.
Section titled “Six links, each checked against the one before”
  1. Commit to build. SLSA provenance, signed through Sigstore, binds the artifact digest to the source commit and the CI identity.
  2. Build to contents. The SBOM attestation binds the same digest to every component inside it.
  3. Build to intent. The twin attestation binds the same digest to the machine definition, its event schemas and its tolerances.
  4. Device to build. At connect, the secure element’s attestation token (EAT, RFC 9711) claims the measured digest of the running build. The server matches it to link 1.
  5. Event to device. Each event is signed by a key that lives only in that secure element, with a monotonic counter and a hash chain.
  6. Event to intent. The server’s twin, loaded by the digest from link 3, judges the event.

A verdict of Conforms therefore means: this event came from a genuine device, running a build made by our pipeline from a known commit, behaving as that build’s signed twin says.

The design is an instance of the IETF Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture, RFC 9334, extended from “is the device in a good state?” to “is it behaving well, event by event?”

RATS role In COREWARD Twin
Attester The device and its secure element
Evidence The attestation token at connect, and each signed event
Endorser The secure element manufacturer’s certificate
Reference Value Provider The CI pipeline: provenance, SBOM and twin, signed through Sigstore
Verifier The reference twin service
Attestation Results The verdicts topic in Kafka
Relying Party Operations, quarantine and access control, auditors
  1. On the device. The device runs only a build whose Sigstore bundle verifies against the expected CI identity. Secure or measured boot records the digest of what started. A secure element (TPM 2.0, an Arm PSA root of trust or a discrete chip) signs each event or snapshot as a COSE_Sign1 message (RFC 9052).
  2. In transit. MQTT 5 over mutual TLS carries the COSE bytes as an opaque payload. A bridge such as Redpanda Connect maps devices/<id>/events to Kafka records keyed by device ID, so each device’s events stay in order.
  3. On the server. The reference twin runs per device, loaded from the attested definition by digest. For each event it decrypts if needed, verifies the signature, the counter and the hash chain, steps the twin and writes a verdict.

The signature travels inside the payload, so it survives every hop and the twin verifies it end to end.